W&M ScholarWorks
Reports
1971

Some sociological perspectives on the formation and operation of
commerical fishery cooperatives
Victor Ligouri
Virginia Institute of Marine Science

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/reports
Part of the Aquaculture and Fisheries Commons

Recommended Citation
Ligouri, V. (1971) Some sociological perspectives on the formation and operation of commerical fishery
cooperatives. Virginia Institute of Marine Science, William & Mary. https://scholarworks.wm.edu/reports/
2631

This Report is brought to you for free and open access by W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Reports by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@wm.edu.

VIrYl.S

5H7

1/. s
• C» I,

,

./)

L04-

1Cft/

C.,.3

Some Sociological Perspectives on the Formation and Operation of
Commercial Fishery Cooperatives

Victqr A. Liguori
November

24,

1971

--~

FISHERY COOPERATIVES - A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anonymous, 1965. Freshwater Cooperatives.
no. 3, 1965, p. 70.

World Fishing (London), vol. 14,

Anonymous, 1970. List of Fishery Cooperatives in the United States.
and Wildlife Service, Fish Leaflet no. 627, pp. 13.
Anonymous, 1968. Mexico: Co-ops Inhibit Investments.
vol. 17, no. 1, Jan. 1968, p. 28.

World Fishing (London),
Fish Trades

Anonymous, 1970. Move to Form Hiffland Shellfish Association.
Gazette (London)-;--ii'o. 47, 5-12-1970, p. 18.
Anonymous, 1970. ~ Cornwall Cooperative.
no. 4563, 19-2170, P• 7.

U.S. Fish

Fish Trades Gazette (London),

Anonymous, 1962. ~ !IJ. Years of Co-operative Shrimping.
(London), vol. 17, no. 1, Jan. 1968, p. 28.
Anonymous, 1963. Progress of Porthleven Scheme.
vol. 11, no. 7, July 1962, p. 47.

World Fishing

World Fishing (London),

Anonymous, 1971. Samband of Iceland. Feder. of Icelandic Coops, Torfi Jonsson,
Editor, Reykjavik, Litha Grafik, 1971, pp. 32.
Anonymous, 1962. Twenty Crabbers are Planned for Parthleven.
(London), No. 2559, 22-6-1962, p. 1

Fishing News

Anonymous, 1971. 22nd Annual Conference of NCS, Stephenville, Newfoundland,
Mimeographed. ~ 13-15, 1971,~~ pp.
Arnold, John R. Earnings of Fishermen ~ Fishing Craft.
National Recovery Administration, 1936.
Digby, Margaret. Cooperation for Fishermen.
1961, (VIMS SH 344 D5J

Washington, D. C.:

F.A.O. of the U.N. New York:

Geoghegan, T. F. Coo erative Marketing of Fish in the Irish Republic.
News (London , No. 30, 10-1970, p-:6. - - Gimson, H.

Annual Report o f ~ Fisheries Organisation Society.
Annual. approx. 70 pp.

Fishing

London.

Hill, A. V. Tides of Change: A Study of Fisherman I s Coops in Br. Columbia.
Prince Rupert. P.R. Fish Coop. Assn., 1967, pp. 279.

2

Liguori, Victor A. Stability ~ Change in ~ Social Strucutre of Atlantic
Coast Comm.erical Fisheries. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1967.
McMullin, Leslie D. Organizing and Operat~ Fishery Coo~eratives.
U.S. Department of Interior, 19 3 (Circular 15 ).

Washington, D. C.

Nowak, W. S. W. Recent Developments in the Fishing Industry of Poland. In:
Meet Poland, Annual Supplement to: Merkuriusz Polski (London)
vol. XV, no. 9, Sept. 1964, p. 28-31.
Nowak, W. S. W.

1970,

Odhe, T.

The Marketing of Shellfish.
263 pp.

Iceland: The Co-operative Island.
League of USA, 115 pp.

Spiraiboon, C.
vol.

London.

Chicago, Ill., Cooperative

Shrimp-farm.in~ Cooperative in Chant-buri.

11, pt. 1, 195, pp. 111-122.

Stelting, W. H. A Case for Fishery Cooperatives.
July 1971, p. 22-23, 45-47Szczepanik, E.
FAO.

Whitefriars Press,

Fish. News {Bankok),

Fishing Gazette (USA),

Fishermens cooperatives in the Indo-Pacific Region. Rept.
Training Center for Fish Coops. 19.58, vol. 2, 126 pp.

Tessore, A., Cooperatives in Roumania.
Oct. 1963, p. 350.
Ttmstall, Jeremy.

~ Fishermen.

Geog. Mag. {London), vol.

London:

McGibbon and Kee,

36, no. 6,

1963. (Ch. 11).

White, Donald J. The New England Fishing Industcy: ! Study" .2f. Price and
~ Setting. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

,.
Conunercial Fishery Cooperatives
This report is intended to present a range of sociological perspectives:
problems, questions pertaining to the fonnation and operation of cooperatives
for and by commercial fishermen.

It is a preliminary report which does not

duplicate those discussions in publications specifically concerned with cooperatives
(included in the selected bibliography), but rather offers themes and generalizations
which I hope will prove useful, subject to criticism and discussion with staff members
of VIMS.

The first part of the report concerns planning the formation of a cooperative,

w.i.th emphasis upon problems which have been encountered elsewhere.
PROBLEM:
1.

Anti-cooperation Value and Behavior Patterns

Exploitation, rather than management/cooperation orientation toward seafood
resources.
(Fishery resources are there to be taken. If I don't get them, then
the next man will. To sit idly and let him gain when you could be out
working too, is foolish.

2.

The deeply internalized belief that fishermen's personalities are intrinsically
in opposition to cooperation.
(See Liguori, pp. 300-301)
SUGGESTION:

In order to profitably understand this matter, I suggest study of the incentives
crucial to the maintenance of conunitment to commercial fishing.
A.

money

(including the importance of the shares system)

The dramatic times, the big catches, often bring failure to remember
financial and morale problems of the recent past and the predictable
future.
QUESTION:
To whom are the various fishennen selling now? How stable
are his selling arrangements? Does he sell to more than one dealer?
Donald l4hite reports that one of the two major causes for failure of
coops is "the refusal of fishennen to discontinue selling their own fish."
(ldlhite po

45)

2.

B.

the role of uncertainty (See Liguori p. 216)
Tunstall underlines the ~ttraction of the gamble of each trip, and of

making it big on his own to the typical fisherman.
accept the traditional costs:

Thus he is prepared to

harsh working conditions, long hours, unfair

if indirect control by those in positions of power.

245)

(Tunstall p.

Fishermen repeatedly stress the fact that high morale they enjoy at sea
when they d.re producing well becomes instantly undermined the moment they
reach shore to learn of disadvantageous prices they will receive.

Many

dealers do not inform fishermen of prices even then, but rather record
volume, then pack and ship, subtract expenses and pre-defined profit and
then set the price per pound.

Fishermen thus learn of the value of their

catch a week or more after it leaves their hands.
I have come to understand that fishermen do indeed value uncertainty: the
gamble on the water against seafood resources and the physical environments.
The hope of a big catch is often what sustains their commitment.

Uncertainty

on land (What price will the dealer give us today?) is anything but an
incentive, and planners of a fishery cooperative should take this fact into
account.
SUGGISTION: Stress to commercial fishermen ci.nd their women the
stability producing advantages of cooperatives.
Stress stability in the payment of earnings and working hours
for women as well as for the fishermen theins elv,~s. Improved working
conditions for women will interest the many wives and sisters of
fishermen working in ancillary occupations.
Stress effect of stabilized earnings upon family life.
C.

Independence
Some see commercial fishermen as the last of the ingrained individualists,
and their insistence on independent labor as an insurmountable barrier

3.
to sustained cooperation
White:

(Liguori, p. 300 ff).

"The fishermen are highly individualistic, short-run in outlook,

and, in a sense, crisis-minded.
sense of self-reliance.

The average fisherman has a powerful

He is not easy to arouse unless the situation

is really tough."
Captain John Lowrey:
"Victor, watch those fish (menhaden). In a minute they' re going to
do something fishermen can't do - get together!"
PROBLEM: Getting fishermen such as those discussed by White above to
enter into and sustain cooperative relationships. The crisis-minded point
is very important indeed.
SUGGESTION: Untangle the important variables which mesh to form the
syndrome of independence.

INDEPENDENT WORKER I:

In American-born as well as European-born connnercial fishermen,
strong approximations of the Protestant Ethic have been often deeply
internalized. Work is regarded as an end in itself; one should never
sit around idly when health, weather and gear permit fishing. He often
exhibits continuous effort in several different technologies.
rA.t least one other type of "independent worker" (Tunstall p. 245;
Lig%ori, p. 220) should be distinguished. This is the man who wishes
not,for cannot, work for an employer. He finds it difficult to work
under rules imposed by others. York record typically much more unstable
than Independent Worker I.
Interestingly, both independent types have shown opposition to minor
but direct control through abiding by the rules of a coop, yet exhibit
a lii..llingness to fatalistically accept control by the fish dealer and
that obscure force called the market.
The desire expressed by the
fishermen is to be left alone to work as they please as they fatalistically
express their inability to understand OF affect the Marketo
The independence syndrome becomes even more problematic to the formation
of cooperatives when fishing is highly competit~v~ and one finds a very
wide range of earnings among fishermen.
SUGGESTION: Indicate to fishermen the costs of their very weak
sense of unit1- (recognizing, of course, enduring forces which
encourage fragmentation).
D.

Habit
N.B.

(How deeply ingrained are a fisherman's behavior patterns.?)
RECOGNIZE TlffiOUGHOUT THE COMMERCIAL FISHING INDUSTRY THE PROFOUND

4.
UNWILLINGNF,S S OR PERCEIVED INABILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL FISHERMEN TO
INITIATE ACTION

(Liguori P• 229)

D.

Job security

(Liguori p. 222 :ff)

Eo

Fonnal education~ Work with the broader perspectives of some fishermen
to document the success of cooperatives operating elsewhere, to reveal
the unfair practices of monopolistic fish dealers, etc.

F.

Minority group status
Does minority group status have anything to do with why some
men fish? Recognize the impact of inter-ethnic group cohesion
or antagonism on the formation and operation of cooperatives.
INVESTIGiTE RELATIONSHIPS: DO not T.AKE MUCH FOR GRANTED.
One might assume, for example, that it is simple to
organize within an ethnic group perceived as "clannish."
In fact, jealousy, not cohesion, may characterize relationships
within the group.
Question:

What implications for fishermen-dealer relationships

can minority group status reveal?
For example, one might find a strong sense of loyalty ;.d.n
some fishermen toward a dealer. This loyalty might be based
upon traditional and subjective, rather than rational economic,
bases. This loyalty may be a greaj:, aid to dealers desiring to
short-circuit incipient cooperative efforts.

G.

Age

H.

Patterns of vessel and gear ownership.
What percentage of boats and gear is owned tu non-fishermen?
Are there strings attached to such ownership?

,.
The following problems are frequently encountered in the actual operation of
fishery cooperatives:
Problem:

Fishermen often express cynicism about the honesty of others.

There will be distrust of the integrity of other fishermen to abide by
the rules of the cooperative, perhaps expressed so:
"Why should I stop fishing or control the volume of my catch, when
some of the others are sneaking off and·selling all they catch whenever they can?"
White notes an interestir:g related problem (White, p.49)
"Often fishermen will fail to discipline indiVi.duals within the organization
to assure conformity with the rumes they themselves pass."
This is not a unique or mysterious circumstance. Often I find that those fishermen
who so dislike being controlled also shrink away from cont:zrolling others if it
is at all possible to do so.
Recognize this pervasive pattern:
Relationships in fishery systems are typically based upon person, rather
than status, orientations.

This is a very important generalization to those

concerned with the formation of cooperatives.
Thus there is a profound belief that even if general efforts to unite fishermen
into cooperation succeeded., the overall effort would fail because of the im-r·
possibility of gaining conformity from certain individuals in -. port

(manifesting

in their personalities excessive stubbornness, indolence, alcoholism, dishonesty,
unreliable work performances, etc.)

In this fashion fishermen may conclude:

"So you see., it wouldn't work," unaware of evidence to the contrary.

Sometimes the cynicism toward the honesty of others takes the form of distrust
of managers of the cooperative.

This stems partly from differing definitions of

the costs of connnitment to commercial fishing (Liguori). (Tunstall notes fishermen
seeing managers as "lazy, chair-bound bastards~ Tunstall p. 245)
I know of one cooperative which failed essentially because producers failed to

.,

6.
trust the ex-fisherman manager because he was no longer a fisherman.

In his new

capacity as manager he was believed to be working in his own interest, not affecting
the deeiees of the fishermen.
SUGGESID:ON':

Institutionalize an orderly change in statuses

Make the status of manager one of the desirable steps upward from the
status of producer, rather than filling the position of secretary-treasurer
with one: individual or another who is or happens not to be an ex-fisherman.
Stress to all concerned the limited rights and responsibilities of the
various official positions of the cooperative.

lnother manifestation of cynicism toward the honesty of others is typically expressed
by fishermen toward fish wholesalers.

This cynicism can work significantly to the

advantage of cooperative organizers.
"Fishermen are often "positive that dealers are depriving them of a decent wage."
(White p. 49) Tpe belief is especially articulated when the two parties represent
different ethnic or racial groups, but is found in almost all connnercial fishery
systems. The belief is not an entirely sugjective perception:
Unfair control and a range of more or less patterned modes of cheating producers are
no secrets to fishermen.

Some antipat}ly toward dealers who make huge profits from

the labors of fishermen stems from conunitment by the latter to the labor theory of
value.

This explains some of the adamant opposition to fishing f.or wages.

SUGG~TION:
Explore the subjective evaluations of the fish dealer by fishermen in
a variety of production/price situations.
SUGG!STION:
Communicate the fact to fishermen that the market is vastly more flexible
than most fish dealers describe it to be. Small scale and extremely traditional
in their operations, fish dealers who say there is no market are really saying:
"I have enough for nowo
seafood right nowo 11

The small number of buyers to whom I ship need no

Stress also the fact that a rational, rather than a traditional, manager, interested
in new markets, might continuously locate buyers for some of that vast percentage of

"urun.arketable" fish most fishermen collect and often wastefully destroy.

PROBLEM:

Fish dealers in a given area will try and 5ave great ability to undennine

infant cooperatives. White (p.

45) notes that dealer opposition is one of the two

most important forces which tend to short-circuit cooperatives.
Gus--------- was approached by another dealer in Cape May.

" Gus,

sell to me.

I'll give you a better price. "

The arrangement worked well for a trip or two, then the new dealer
explained to Gus that he could buy no more fish. (He and his physical
plant were threatened with destruction.)
When Gus came to the original wholesaler again he was told;

" Gus,

you look sick. No good for a man to work sick. You res1t.. for,
say, three weeks; then I think you'll feel more like working.

'fflSK:

Defuse the fish dealer's ability to unlawfully disrupt or discourage those
interested in working in cooperatives.

It is important to align political,

as well as economic, power behind the cooperative and to publicize this
effectively;

it is crucial place the persuasive prestige as well as power

of the law on the side of the coop.

QUESTION: What is the extent of a fisherman's membership in voluntary organizations
in general and industry-related ·voluntary organizations in particular?
(see Liguori p. 263 ff)
How do the fishermen subjectively and operationally define cooperation?
(see Liguori p. 300)

.
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The problem here is the absense of a sense of traditional union membership.
NOTE PATTERN:
The criteria employed by fishermen for organizing reference groups outside of
work are very particularistic, generally.

Activities do not include "all those

who are fishermen," but rather are drawn along lines of ethnicity, kinship or
residence for example.
Fishermen often express their distaste for formally organized meetings.
"We don't have time for meetings."
"You can't waste no time sitting at no meeting when you got work to do."
Instrwnental also in this approach is the tremendous pragmatism exhibited by
most cormnercial f:i.s hermen; the result is impatience with anything which even
appears as though it is a waste of time.
SUGGESTION:

Work hard to have voluntary meetings instrumental, rather than

expressive.

Have prepared agenda for each meeting.

Have an individual

preside who can maintain order and still invite commentaries from those
who believe themselves to be hopelessly inarticulate.

MISCELLIN!DUS QUESTIONS:
From whom does the fisherman buy his gear and daily supplies? Does he define
his buying relationships as favorable?

What are the patterns of mobility (long and short range) exhibited by the
various captains in an area?

SUMMARY SUGGESTIONS:

Work with and from the basic value orientations of the fishermen.
I.

Independence can be seen as the ability to shape your own life, including
limiting the control fish dealers exert over you. Be independent
from them.
Stress that pay is still in terms of shares, but that earnings may be paid
to fishermen and their families in a variety of different ways. Stress stability
plus independence.
Note the widespread tendency among fishermen and their wives to discourage

their sons from making a career of commercial fishing.

Relate the advantages of

cooperative membership to those depressing aspects of the industry which weigh
heavily on parent~ minds.

Some of these conditions~ change sufficiently to

open up the possibility of sons choosing to profitably work on the water.
2.

Stress the practicality of the idea and the organization of the cooperative:

Many fishermen do not realize that it can and does work, and will reject the
idea simply because they do not know of its success anywhere.

in

What isAneed of

attention is not the concept of cooperation, but rather an extension of their
awareness of national and international efforts at cooperation.

Try and convince the highliners and the bright young men whose fa~alism is not
so solidly built upon traditional, religious, regional or ethnic foundationso
MAKE CL~R THE COSTS AND THE REWARIS of cooperative efforts.
Stress that coop membership has provided some fishermen with their first
voluntcllrY vaa:Ltions and days off.
Indicate honestly which technological subsystems have had most ~nd which
have had least success with the concept of cooperatives in the United States.
Stress the certainty of improved ouality of their seafood opening up new
and more profitable marketso

Be continuously aware of factors which may undermine the trust of the

./

10.

membershipo
The most pervasive suggestion of this report is:
Point out to the commercial .fishermen the centralitl
oooperate with~ other to
-~roblems and troubleso

~ ~

.2f

their failure to

of their specific recurring and occasion;al

